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Since he became Party General Secretary on March 11, 1985, 
Mikhail Gorbachev has been presiding over a veritable revolution in 
the Soviet Union. It is but one facet of the upheaval occurring that, 
while continuing as Party General Secretary, he derives his authority 
over Soviet affairs in no less degree from his status as President, a post 
newly created on March 14, 1990 and to which he was elected by an 
extra-party legislative body.
Gorbachev has been endeavouring to achieve a restructuring—or 
perestroika as the process is now known everywhere—of Soviet soci 
ety generally, but he has been especially concerned to reform the econ 
omy. As one need only refer to the daily news to become aware, the 
improved performance he is seeking has turned out to be decidedly 
elusive. A summary review, however, may provide perspective on a 
complex and ever-shifting scene. It may also provide needed back 
ground for judging the possible import of further dramatic reform mea 
sures currently being debated, though regrettably I cannot probe these 
in any depth here. 1
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I
We must have in mind some more or less familiar facts concerning 
the state of the Soviet economy when Gorbachev became General Sec 
retary. At that time, the Soviet economy was still organized much as it 
had been under Stalin, with the means of protection predominantly 
publicly owned. The collective farm, prevailing in a considerable seg 
ment of agriculture, was an outstanding exception to this rule, owner 
ship there being cooperative rather than public. But the distinction was 
largely nominal, and enterprises of both sorts were administered 
through the famous system of central planning that in essentials had 
originated with Stalin.
Soviet central planning has become notorious for its cumbersome 
bureaucratic character, but tempos of growth under Stalin and for a 
time under his successors were quite respectable by Western standards. 
Nevertheless, such tempos did not persist. Soviet national income, 
which was still growing by as much as 5.1 percent yearly in the 1960s, 
has slowed markedly since that time. By 1981-85, the tempo had fallen 
to 1.9 percent (Table 1). Western students of the Soviet economy gen 
erally consider unclassified CIA estimates as more reliable than similar 
measures of growth released by the Soviet government. Soviet official 
data also show a marked decline in growth, but growth rates are almost 
always higher than recorded by the CIA.
While growth rates were once high, output expansion was expen 
sive. Under an extensive growth process that Stalin initiated, the gov 
ernment relied primarily on the sheer multiplication of inputs of labor 
and capital to increase output 2 This process contrasts to the intensive 
one familiar in the West, where output expansion tends to be generated 
in good part by technological progress and gains in efficiency more 
generally. Although that requires outlays for research and develop 
ment, the costs of additional output under the intensive process tend to 
be distinctly less than under the extensive one.
The difference is material, for the more costly the expansion the 
more limited the rewards for consumers. And under Stalin such 
rewards were limited indeed, but the Dictator died on March 5, 1953.
Table 1




1. Net material product (NMP), Soviet official8
2. Gross national product (GNP), CIA estimates1*
3. Gross fixed capital investment, Soviet official*1
4. Industrial output, Soviet official
5. Industrial output, CIA estimates"
6. Agricultural output, Soviet official6
7. Agricultural output, CIA estimates"-6
8. Real income per capita, Soviet official








































1986; June 19, 1986; June 20,
1986; John Pitzer (1982), CIA (1985, pp. 64ff; 1989, pp. 45, 58ff); Gertrude E. Schroeder and M. Elizabeth Denton (1982). For consumption,
and agricultural output, 1976-85, unclassified CIA data supplied to author.
a. Utilized for consumption and accumulation.
1981-85,
b. Output valued in 1970 prices for growth rates for 1961-75 and in 1982 prices for growth rates for 1976-85.
c. Not available.
d. CIA estimates essentially accord with Soviet official data.
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If only out of a concern for morale and as incentives for an increas 
ingly educated and sophisticated labor force, Stalin's successors have 
felt impelled to moderate his onerous priorities.
While consumers have benefited as a result (Table 1), that modera 
tion has meant a slowing of expansion in the volume of investment, 
and that has contributed in turn to the slowdown in output growth. As a 
cause of the slowdown, however, the retardation of investment volume 
growth has only compounded the impact of another, widely reported 
trend. The Soviet labor force, which grew by 1.4 to 1.8 percent yearly 
during the 1960s and 1970s has more recently been increasing at less 
than half that pace.3 Although output growth has slowed, it has 
remained of the costly, extensive sort. Indeed, it may, if anything, have 
become even more costly than it was before.4
The Soviet growth process nevertheless enabled a once backward 
country to become, in time, a military superpower. But in 1985, when 
Gorbachev became General Secretary, Soviet per capita consumption 
was little more and very possibly less than 30 percent of the U.S. per 
capita consumption. 5
In the USSR, the immediate pre-Gorbachev years have come to be 
referred to as years of stagnation (zastoi). Regarding the economy, that 
must be considered as hyperbole to a degree, but Gorbachev had good 
reason to be concerned upon being elevated to General Secretary. As 
we may judge from his actions as well as pronouncements, he was, in 
fact, deeply concerned.
II
The economic reform measures Gorbachev has initiated have been 
numerous and diverse, but a principal aim has been to restructure 
industrial planning. It seems clear that that is also a sphere in which his 
efforts thus far have not been especially fruitful.
This is particularly evident in respect of the attempt to upgrade the 
role of the industrial enterprise vis-a-vis that of central planning 
authorities and in the process to substitute market-type for bureaucratic
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control over enterprise operations. Under Soviet central planning, 
bureaucratic control over the enterprise has never been as complete 
and control of a market type never as lacking as often supposed; but, 
after a period of experimentation, the government in June and July 
1987 adopted legislation supposedly providing for increased reliance 
on market-type control at the expense of bureaucratic control.6
The legislation affirms that "the enterprise independently works out 
and confirms its plans." The plans in question, it is explained, are to be 
those for five years as well as one year. This was, on the face of it, quite 
a shift from previous practice.
The grant of authority to the enterprise is qualified, however, and as 
it has turned out, the qualification has been rather important. Among 
other things, the enterprise is obliged to accept so-called "state orders" 
(goszakazy) for its output that are submitted to it by the superior minis 
try. Such orders apparently were intended to serve the ministry as a 
transitional means of directing and coordinating enterprise activities. 
Initially controlling a substantial share of the enterprise's output, the 
state order was supposedly to give way rapidly to wholesale trade.
In fact, the state order immediately became and still is a major 
instrument by which ministries control the activities of subordinate 
enterprises. As Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov acknowledged in May 
of this year (Pravda, May 25,1990), "for the most important products, 
government orders the basic part of output—up to 95 percent."
Why was so little accomplished in this sphere? One explanation 
often given in the USSR as well as the West stresses vested interests of 
superior bureaucratic agencies. Concerned about their hierarchical and 
material status, ministerial personnel in particular, it is said, seek 
whenever possible to maintain control over the enterprise.
There is doubtless some truth in that view, but under the 1987 
reforms the ministry is still responsible for the performance of enter 
prises subordinate to it. At least, it is accountable for fulfillment of its 
own plan. In this circumstance, even personally disinterested ministry 
officials must hesitate to relax fully their grip on the enterprise.
Then, too, in order for wholesale trade to effectively supersede 
bureaucratic control, it must function as a market. That is to say, enter-
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prises must be structured to respond appropriately to prices of their 
inputs and outputs, and prices in turn must fluctuate appropriately in 
response to the resulting enterprise supply and demand.
A principal aim of the 1987 reform measures was to subject the 
enterprise to increased financial discipline, which previously had often 
been wanting, and in doing so to make rewards more dependent than 
before on financial results, especially profits. Insofar as such rearrange 
ments materialized, the enterprise should have been oriented broadly to 
respond to prices as in a market environment.
But financial discipline seemingly continues to be an elusive 
desideratum for the Soviet enterprise. Indeed, there may well have 
been some retrogression in this sphere, with the enterprise, perhaps as 
a counterpoint to its subjection to state orders, being even less obser 
vant than before of financial constraints. Particular difficulty appar 
ently has been encountered in the control of wages. Unplanned growth 
of the wage bill accounted, for example, for more than half of an 
extraordinary increase of 9 percent last year.7 As we shall see, the 
unbridled growth of wages has been costly in more ways than one.
But for an effective market, not only must enterprises be subject to 
appropriate financial constraints, prices must be appropriately deter 
mined. For industrial wholesale prices, that was far from the case 
before 1987, and it still is. Rather than being determined by market 
forces, industrial wholesale prices are, for the most part, fixed by the 
government. Under the 1987 reforms, the principles observed in this 
sphere were to be altered in various ways, but prices were not to be 
revised accordingly until January 1,1990. The price revision has since 
been further deferred, so that prices are still much as they were in June 
and July 1987, when the reforms were initiated.
That is also to say that they can have had little to do with the scar 
city values that an effective market generates. Rather, they have, at 
best, reflected costs of earlier years—usually costs of 1982, when the 
last major price revision was carried out.
The failure of the government to revise industrial wholesale prices, 
if not to free them from control has been one of the most serious defi 
ciencies of its efforts thus far to reform central planning, in my opin-
Soviet Economic Reform Under Gorbachev 41
ion. The more or less arbitrary prices have made a mockery of the 
government's efforts to rationalize and invigorate financial controls 
over the enterprise. Such controls have, in any case, proved no more 
effective than they were before.
While seeking to enhance the authority of the industrial enterprise, 
the government has also been in the process of restructuring the enter 
prise's internal administration. It has since retreated, however, from 
one particularly interesting 1987 innovation. The arrangement for 
workers' election of the manager, Yugoslav-style, that was adopted in 
1987 has since been abandoned.8 As Prime Minister Ryzhkov has 
explained, the manager of a state enterprise is appropriately appointed 
by the state whose interests, as owner, he represents.
Ill
While for Gorbachev the reform of industrial planning has been a 
cardinal concern, economic restructuring has called for action much 
beyond that. Indeed, reform in another related sphere, not so much 
stressed initially, may well have come to be considered of comparable 
urgency to that of industrial planning. The shifts in property relations 
being instituted could prove more rewarding, though here too the road 
to reform has not been exactly smooth. While the shifts occurring have 
attracted much notice in the West, they are not always well understood.
Early on (November 19, 1986), the Gorbachev administration 
declared to be permissible a wide variety of private enterprise activities 
that previously had been prohibited or were at least legally dubious. 
Subject to local licensing, private enterprise was legally sanctioned in 
such diverse fields as handicraft manufacture, construction and repair, 
and various other services. Diverse activities were still excluded, how 
ever, and individuals who are normally employable in the public sector 
were supposed to work on their own account only after hours. Employ 
ment of hired labor was expressly forbidden.9
Even as thus restricted, this legislation represented a distinct break 
with the past, but it was enacted in a milieu long conditioned to hostil-
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ity to private enterprise. The restrictions maintained on private enter 
prise activity must be seen in that light, and so too must be the 
government's decision to levy onerously progressive taxes on any ele 
vated private enterprise incomes. 10
Not too surprisingly, enactment of the new legislation on private 
enterprise has not been followed by any wholesale shift to such activ 
ity. Nearly four years later there were still only 500,000 persons regis 
tered for employment in private enterprise (Pravda, July 7,1990).
A near counterpart of such private enterprise, however, has fared 
decidedly better. While nominally a producers' cooperative (co-op) the 
collective farm, as I noted, is practically a state enterprise. That is also 
true of the consumers' co-op that continued through the years to func 
tion in trade, primarily in rural localities.
After much public discussion, however, the Gorbachev administra 
tion has declared the cooperative to be a basic form, along with state 
enterprise, of socialist economic organization, and has acted to codify 
its widespread use as a substantially autonomous entity in industry, 
trade, and services. Here too some activities have been expressly 
excluded, and members must participate actively in the cooperative's 
work; employment of hired labor is allowed, however. 11
While ideologically on a somewhat different plane from individual 
private enterprise, the cooperative has by no means enjoyed an easy 
acceptance. But in the critical sphere of taxation, its members, after 
much controversy and vacillation, have come to be treated on a par 
with workers in state enterprise. 12 The upshot has been a rapid increase 
in employment in co-ops, the number of persons engaged having 
reached by now five million (Izvestiia, July 29, 1990) or some 3 per 
cent of the labor force.
The activities of co-ops are diverse. Particularly noteworthy is the 
fact that they are beginning to take advantage of further novel legisla 
tion allowing them, along with other interested parties, to acquire con 
trol over productive assets by leasehold contract. In the process, they 
have even taken over, under contract, shops or departments of state 
enterprises. Under the lease agreement, they usually produce for sale to 
the lessor enterprise. 13 While such arrangements are so far of very
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modest dimensions quantitatively, they have been seen in the USSR as 
a possible basis for extensive privatization of state enterprise (FBIS, 
Dec. 20,1989, p. 47).
Leasing has been envisaged in that way regarding not only industry, 
but agriculture. Indeed, some Soviet economists have seen the lease 
arrangement as a way to supplant collective and state farm agriculture 
with not only genuine co-ops but individual family farms. Here too, 
though, such restructuring has, to date, materialized only on a minute 
scale (Report on the USSR, July 14, 1989; Brooks, 1990a; 1990b; 
Pravda, July 29,1990).
Promotion of private enterprise is also the apparent objective of a 
still more novel measure just enacted. As well as being very new, the 
law on joint stock companies is very complex. But, through an appro 
priate distribution of shares, it evidently could be, like the lease, an 
instrument for privatization of state enterprise, and its use in that way 
has been urged by no less a person than Nikolai Petrakov, an advisor to 
Gorbachev. Having enacted legislation of this sort, the government, not 
surprisingly, seems to have finally abandoned its prohibition of 
employment of hired labor by private enterprise. 14
I alluded to the prevalence in the USSR of a hostility to private 
enterprise. Once deeply rooted ideologically, such hostility is now in 
the process of erosion. At least it no longer shapes public policy as it 
once did. By no means, however, has it been rendered nugatory. Its 
influence can still be seen in residual legislative disabilities and restric 
tions to which I have referred, and even more in the administration of 
relevant statutes. Often left to republican and local governments, such 
administration has tended to compound obstacles to newer enterprise 
forms. 15
Private enterprise, moreover, continues to be affected by a related 
factor that is at the same time unfavorable as well as favorable. Soviet 
planning is in the process of being reformed, but it is as yet not radi 
cally different from what it was previously. That is to say, it is still a 
system where prices are notably distorted and shortages notably fre 
quent. 16
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In this environment private enterprise, predictably, has often had to 
cope with daunting difficulties, especially in materials procurement, 
and has often experienced very favorable opportunities, such as pro 
vided by high prices for products in short supply. In these circum 
stances, private enterprise, also predictably, has often engaged in 
bribery and other illicit activities, and frequently earns large rewards 
which, even when derived from legitimate activities, are easily seen as 
inordinate. The Soviet leadership is apparently committed to the exten 
sion of private enterprise, but that can be expected to continue to be, as 
it has been, a troubled process.
IV
We have considered the number of major economic reforms initi 
ated since Gorbachev became Party General Secretary in March 1985. 
In seeking to grasp the import of perestroika for the economy, we must 
now turn to a further development—though it is properly viewed as a 
retrogression rather than as a reform.
Under central planning, while the government relied generally on 
bureaucratic procedures to coordinate and direct economic activities, it 
also made limited use of market-like arrangements for that purpose. 
Among other things, it traditionally distributed consumer goods to 
households through a retail market. There households were able to pur 
chase consumer goods with money they received in wages in return for 
services rendered or in other ways. For the most part, goods were made 
available to households at fixed prices in state retail shops, but house 
holds could also obtain foodstuffs in free markets where collective 
farms and their members disposed of surplus supplies.
Households could acquire consumer goods in these ways, insofar as 
such products were available. In fact, they were by no means always 
available, for with state shops the preponderant outlet and supplies and 
prices for the most part determined through a bureaucratic process, the 
retail market did not work very well. Lately, it has hardly worked at all.
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Never entirely absent from the Soviet scene, queues and empty shop 
shelves have now become pervasive. Some scarce products are 
rationed locally or distributed preferentially to their workers by 
employing establishments. For the rest, the ruble has been aptly held to 
be not real money, but a kind of lottery ticket, generally redeemable for 
goods only with luck and perseverance.
The breakdown of the Soviet consumer goods market has been 
widely reported. As rarely understood, however, there has been no 
sharp fall-off in consumer goods supplies. Provision of some food 
stuffs is down, and supplies of other products—cigarettes are the latest 
example—have fallen off irregularly. Per capita consumption overall, 
however, according to the CIA (CIA, DIA 1990) is little, if at all, 
below pre-Gorbachev levels.
Supplies, nevertheless, are in fact markedly short of demand. That is 
due chiefly to a mushrooming government budget deficit, which last 
year reached 92 billion rubles or 10 percent of the Gross National 
Product. The government has been funding the deficit in good part by 
inordinate currency emissions. 17 Lax wage and credit controls, to 
which I have already referred, have compounded the inflationary 
development.
The government, however, has chosen to hold down most consumer 
goods prices, so that the inflation has been primarily repressed rather 
than overt. Thus, the major imbalance of demand and supply that has 
materialized has resulted not so much in price increases as in involun 
tary household savings in the form of cash and savings deposits. The 
savings have been involuntary in the sense that goods have not been 
available on which to spend them.
The breakdown of the consumer goods market has, needless to say, 
been onerous for consumers, but it has also been costly otherwise. By 
eroding labor incentives, as widely reported, it has begun to cause what 
in the USSR is euphemistically called a "falling off of interest in 
work."
I referred earlier to the difficulties posed for reform by the continued 
prevalence of economically irrational wholesale prices. It has not 
helped that at the artificially low levels at which the government has
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held them, retail prices too have been notably divorced from scarcity 
values. For food products the prevailing low retail levels could be 
maintained only through provision of subsidies which in the aggregate 
were nearly as large as the entire government budget deficit (FBIS, 
Sept. 28,1989).
Why has the Gorbachev administration allowed such a doleful con 
juncture to materialize? Soviet commentary is not as incisive on that 
very relevant question as one might wish, but long accustomed to a 
consumer goods market that was not exactly flawless, the leadership, 
one surmises, was not as alert and sensitive initially as it might have 
been to the deleterious effects of the budgetary indiscipline in which 
they indulged. If only tardily, they have now come to grasp clearly 
enough the unfavorable results of such a financial policy, and have 
been seeking in diverse ways to repair the damage. 18 But, as we know 
from our own experience, balancing a budget, once it is greatly out of 
balance, is a neat trick, not easily accomplished.
Gorbachev had reason enough to try to reform the Soviet economy. 
How has the economy performed since then? In view of the breakdown 
of the consumer goods market, the question in a sense answers itself, 
but it is still of interest to observe that, as estimated by the CIA, growth 
of output overall actually accelerated in 1986 (Table 2). That was due 
chiefly, however, to a bumper farm crop. Since 1986, growth has 
tended to be even slower than in 1981-85. The agricultural harvest this 
year has reportedly been exceptional again, but industrial output is now 
declining absolutely, and the fall could be marked. 19 The ambitious tar 
gets of the 13th five-year plan (1986-90), set early on by the Gor 
bachev administration (Table 1), are evidently far beyond reach.
If Gorbachev has not yet succeeded in reinvigorating the Soviet 
economy as he set out to do, that is not very surprising. The political 
revolution that he has also been actively promoting has rightly been 
acclaimed in the West and clearly enjoys wide support in the USSR
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itself, but the resultant disintegration of totalitarianism has often 
brought with it notable indiscipline and disorder, which are hardly 
favorable to economic performance. The recent, much-noted Soviet 
Republic assertions of sovereignty are only one, albeit important, man 
ifestation of this new Soviet politics.
Table 2
Growth of National Income, USSR
Annual Average, 1981-85 and 1986-89, and Annually, 1986-89
(percent)






















SOURCES: Table 1; TSSU (1989, p. 16); CIA-DIA(1990). 
a. "Utilized for consumption and accumulation." 
b. 1986-88. 
c. Not available.
In pondering the experience to date under Gorbachev, one must con 
sider too that his five years in office is after all a very brief interval in 
which to transform an economic system that was some seven decades 
in the making. A surge in growth would have been nice, but as Soviet 
economists themselves have properly cautioned, was hardly to be 
expected. 20
Granting the extenuating circumstances, however, questions may be 
raised about the nature and implementation of the reform program that 
the government has initiated. One must wonder particularly whether 
the egregious inconsistencies in the measures to restructure industrial 
planning could not have been foreseen and avoided. Among Western 
students of the Soviet economy, a questions is also often raised about 
the underlying strategy, especially the priority accorded the relatively
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intractable task of reforming industrial planning over that of privatiza 
tion of agriculture and services.
I have been referring to Soviet economic performance under Gor 
bachev as it is manifest in overall growth. Unsatisfactory as the record 
has been from that standpoint, it has been much less satisfactory in 
respect of the rudimentary task of distributing among households 
available supplies of consumer goods. Costly for the consumers, the 
retail market breakdown is probably also beginning to have an adverse 
impact on production and growth. And here too it is permissible to ask 
whether, with more skillful management at the highest level, a more 
favorable outcome might not have been achievable. 21
But, disappointing though economic reform has been, it need not be 
irrevocably so. Do not some of the reform measures, especially those 
in the sphere of ownership, have potentialities yet to be effectively 
exploited? If, on the other hand, there has often been less than profi 
cient management, is that not remediable? What, in any event, are the 
prospects that economic reform will become a more rewarding 
endeavor in due course?
The answers must depend in good part on the outcome of discus 
sions now in progress, to which I alluded at the outset. The dismal 
results of reform thus far have, not surprisingly, provoked wide-rang 
ing debate over its future course. The outcome of such discussion is 
still not too clear, but one perhaps need not wait for t 's to be crossed 
and f s to be dotted on resultant measures to anticipate that restructur 
ing favorable to private enterprise and the market already in progress 
will continue, very possibly at an accelerated pace. The imbalance in 
the consumer goods market could be ameliorated in the process, but 
that seems especially conjectural. 22
Unfortunately, all signs also point to a continuation of the indisci 
pline and disorder lately experienced. Such behavior could easily 
become more prevalent under the impact of ongoing political shifts, 
especially the still unlegitimated transfer of power under way from the 
center to the republics. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 
economic reinvigoration that Gorbachev has been seeking will likely 
continue to be elusive for some time to come. The USSR, it has been
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said, is now at the edge of the abyss. That is doubtless hyperbole, but 
the short-term outlook for the Soviet economy is hardly bright.
NOTES
1. With the kind permission of Dr. Armand Clesse, I sometimes draw on a paper, "Economics 
of Perestroika" which I presented at a conference in Luxembourg in 1988, and which was 
subsequently published in Armand Clesse and Thomas C. Schelling, eds., The Western 
Community and the Gorbachev Challenge. Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1989.1 allude in the text to an 
ongoing debate on the future course of economic reform, and in conclusion allow myself to 
speculate on the outcome of this controversy. These very general remarks still seemed sufficiently 
apt not to require revision when news came (on the day of the lecture!) of Gorbachev's 
recommendations to the Supreme Soviet on the matter at issue.
2. See the measures of "factor productivity" in Bergson (1989a; ch. 6); CIA (1988, p. 63).
3. The decline in labor force growth is due to reduced increases in labor participation rates as 
well as demographic factors. See Fesbach (1983); Rapawy and Baldwin (1982, Part 2), and CIA 
(1987, p. 70).
4. See Bergson (1989) and CIA (1988).
5. Essentially an extrapolation from Schroeder and Denton (1982) and Bergson (1989a, ch. 4), 
using data in CIA (1987, pp. 53,66); Economic Report of the President (1988, p. 279).
6. For the relevant decrees and related legislation, see O korennoi... (1987). For an 
illuminating discussion of this legislation and its antecedents, see Hewett, Winston et al. (1987); 
Schroeder (1987); Hewett (1988); Joint Economic Committee (1987); Desai (1989). Note that the 
key measure on the state enterprise, enacted on June 30,1987, was not to become effective until 
Jan. 1,1988.
7. Pravda, Jan. 28,1990. The government instituted in the fourth quarter of 1990 an onerous 
tax on inordinate increases in wages in industries other than those producing consumer goods 
(Pravda, Aug. 11, 1990), but the intended discouragement of such boosts hardly materialized. 
That has been, it seems essentially because of the elliptic interpretation of the scope of exempt 
industries.
8. See FBIS, Dec. 14,1989, pp. 42-43; Izvestiia, June 12,1990. The 1987 legislation also gave 
to the workers' collective the option to have their incomes determined, in the Yugoslav manner, as 
a residual share after nonlabor expenses and taxes. This arrangement too, I believe, is no longer 
allowed.
9. For the Nov. 19,1986 decree, see Pravda, Nov. 21,1986. On the decree and its application 
in practice, see also Blough, Muratore, and Berk (1987, vol. 2); Roucek (1988); Pomorski (1988).
10. In its latest formulation (Pravda, May 6,1990), the tax on, say, a full-time handicraftsman 
is not as progressive as it was formerly, but the marginal rate still rises quickly from 20 percent on 
incremental income at the 3,001 ruble annual income level to 60 percent on such income in excess 
of 6,000 rubles. For wage earners and salaried workers, too, the marginal tax rate rises to 60 
percent, but not until the annual income reaches 36,000 rubles. Even so, the tax on such workers 
has become more progressive than it was formerly.
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11. For the key statutes, see Pravda, June 8, 1988; FBIS, October 23, 1989, Nov. 16, 1989, 
July 12,1990. On excluded activities, see also FBIS, Jan. 5, 1989; Report on the USSR, Feb. 3, 
1989.
12. See Pravda, May 6,1990. All-union legislation on the taxation of cooperatives as such, as 
distinct from their members, also seems not to discriminate against such organizations, but 
republican authorities are apparently allowed a degree of discretion to do so, if they should so 
wish (Izvestiia, June 29,1990).
13. Leasing of productive assets is not new in the USSR, but the government seems to have 
modified regulations for its wide use only recently, initially in a law of April 7, 1989, and then 
apparently in a revised version in a law of Nov. 23, 1989 (Pravda, April 9, 1989, December 1, 
1989).
14. The basic law (Ekonomika i zhizn'. No. 27, July 1990) should be read together with 
additional measures on ownership (Pravda, March 10,1990) and on small business (FBIS, Aug. 
10, 1990, p. 43). See also Report on the USSR, May 11, 1990. Petrakov apparently envisages a 
distribution of shares primarily among state institutions, such as banks and local governments, but 
they would also be made available to private individuals (Moscow News, No. 26,1990).
15. On the restrictive republican and local policies and practices, and on the disabilities of 
private enterprise more generally, see Plokker (1990). Also illuminating regarding the status of 
the co-ops in particular is FBIS, July 13,1989, pp. 71-74.
16. In the consumer goods market, of particular importance to private enterprise, the price 
distortions and shortages have, if anything, become more pronounced under Gorbachev. See 
below, Section IV.
17. Ofer (1990) and the related comment of Bergson.
18. Most notably in the program presented by Ryzhkov to the Supreme Soviet in May but not 
approved by that body. An outstanding feature was the proposal to sharply increase prices of 
consumer goods, including grossly subsidized food products. See FBIS (May 25,1990).
19. The state statistical office reports (Pravda, July 29, 1990) that Net Material Product 
declined by 2.0 percent during the first six months of 1990 compared with the corresponding 
period in 1989. Reference is to "national income produced" rather than "national income 
utilized," but the statistical office has now begun to report also on the GNP, apparently as that is 
understood in the West. For the first half of 1990, that shows a decline of 1 percent. These figures 
for the first half, which are probably inflated, would not register the exceptional harvest, but by 
the same token should indicate a decline in nonfarm output. There are many indications that that 
decline is accelerating.
20. Soviet economists seemed to be optimistic initially, though, in supposing that the 
transformation could be completed in a relatively brief period (FBIS, Feb. 12,1988, pp. 66ff, May 
11.1988, pp. 81ff, May 23,1988, pp. 81ff).
21. It may not be amiss to note that for the writer this is not just hindsight. I stressed the fiscal 
incongruities at a symposium in Moscow in December 1987. What I said, though, was apparently 
no surprise to at least one Soviet participant, Leonid Abalkin.
22. On the principal alternative programs being considered, see FBIS (May 25, 1990); 
Ryzhkov (Pravda, Sept. 12,1990); Shatalin et al. (Izvestiia, Sept. 4,1990).
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